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Sunday, April 8, 2012

Why did God want Jesus to suffer?

Christians face an interesting theological challenge regarding the crucifixion of Jesus, insofar as we want to know why Jesus had to suffer in order to save the faithful. God, being omnipotent, appears to have the power to save the faithful, regardless of whether he also sent Jesus to suffer on the cross. In order to explain why it was better for him to do so, we might be tempted to invoke the notion of justice. However, if we want to appeal to God's favorite system of justice to explain why Jesus had to suffer, then we must know why that system is ultimately good for us. Since we do not in fact know how God's rules of cosmic justice are ultimately good for us, then no appeal to those rules will serve as a satisfactory explanation.

In the actual world (per Christianity), we have the following scenario:

(A) God sends the faithful to Heaven instead of Hell, and he also sends Jesus to die on the cross.


Consider the following hypothetical variation on this:

(H) God sends the faithful to Heaven instead of Hell, but he does not send Jesus to suffer on the cross.


In (H), everyone has (as far as we know) the same amount of joy and suffering except Jesus, who has at least the same amount of joy but is spared a great deal of suffering, when compared to (A). So on (A), there appears to be an equal or lesser amount of total joy but greater total suffering than on (H).

If we take for granted that (H) is coherent, which certainly appears to be the case, then God, being omnipotent, has the power to instantiate (H). Instead, though, he chose to instantiate (A), thereby expressing his preference for it. So the Christian here faces a pretty steep challenge, to answer the following question:

(C) Why does God prefer (A) to (H)?


Now, we need to make the move from talking about the total balance of suffering and joy to speaking in terms of well-being, i.e. what is good for a person. It is not immediately clear how to connect the two, but it seems to me quite intuitive to suppose that, at least on the surface, (H) appears better for Jesus, and not any worse for anyone else. Maybe this is not the case, but it seems a reasonable initial assumption given the way (H) is constructed. In other words, at first blush, the following appears to be true:

(1) Everyone in scenario (H) has the same well-being as in scenario (A), except for Jesus, whose well-being is greater in (H) than in (A).


However it turns out that, despite appearances, (1) must be false, for the following reason: By hypothesis, God is omnibenevolent, which we shall take to mean (among other things) that he is principally concerned with the well-being of other conscious creatures. If (1) were true, then given this guiding principle, God would instantiate (H) instead of (A). However God has instantiated (A); so, by contrapositive, (1) is false.

These considerations set the context for evaluating the following possible answer to (C):

(2) God prefers (A) to (H) because (A) respects God's justice system whereas (H) does not.


Unfortunately, this answer is problematic. It's not that (2) is false; however it doesn't really explain very much, because it leaves a mystery why God should care about his justice system. It cannot be that God just really loves his favorite justice system for its own sake, since part of what it means to be omnibenevolent is to care principally for the well-being of others. Rather, God must love his justice system at least in part because it somehow results in (not necessarily strictly) greater well-being overall. So anyone using (2) as an answer to (C) therefore faces the following additional challenge:

(C') How is it that God's justice system results in a better total balance of well-being?


I submit that nobody has an answer for (C'). Furthermore, it seems clear that anyone using (2) to answer (C) hasn't provided a satisfactory explanation so long as (C') remains unanswered.

To see what we mean by "satisfactory," consider the following analogy: Suppose John asks Mary, "why did you go to college?" and Mary responds, "I went to college in order to obtain my college degree." Now, Mary's answer doesn't have to be false, exactly; indeed it seems quite natural to suppose that she went to college for the purpose of obtaining her college degree. Yet clearly she has not actually provided a satisfactory response in stating this fact. For John quite obviously wants to know why Mary cares about having a college degree, and in her answer she completely avoided dealing with that issue.

Similarly, (2) is not a satisfying answer to (C) unless we have an answer to (C'). Since we do not in fact have an answer to (C'), the Christian has not by offering (2) provided a satisfactory explanation for God's preference of (A) over (H).

In short, appealing to a system of rules to explain Jesus' suffering on the cross isn't helpful unless we understand how that system of rules improves our overall well-being. So, since we don't know how God's favorite system of rules of cosmic justice improves our overall well-being, it cannot adequately explain Jesus' suffering.

24 comments:

Tyrel said...

Posted in two parts:


This presents itself as a puzzling question, but I think a satisfactory answer can be got to a number of ways. The first is to take the basic Anselmian line (that the God-man had to die for the sins of mankind in order to redeem man, because God's justice demands satisfaction). However, one must recognize that religious language here, at least on a Catholic view, is analogical, and therefore justice is here being spoken of properly by analogy. That doesn't mean that the Anselmian view isn't, strictly speaking, 'true', it just isn't intended in quite the same sense as a legally binding contract (for, if Jesus, in the strictest legal sense, died for the sins of mankind, then God would owe man salvation on pain of being unjust). Instead, this view recognizes that human intuitions with respect to 'justice', enshrined in our social institutions (however primitive), reflect an ultimate awareness of some standard of justice (and implicitly fairness and judgement). Thus, when Christ comes to save man by dying on the cross, God is establishing a covenant with man which appeases God's justice, (that is, justice itself as a principle) and at once allows God to be merciful - two attributes which would otherwise be thought to conflict.
However, the more sophisticated view entertained by Augustine and Aquinas has been that God did not, strictly speaking, have to send his only son into the world to die for sins. In fact, Aquinas is explicit about how unnecessary this was in the strictest literal sense. Most of Catholic theology, therefore, has entertained the view that Christ's death on the cross was, as Aquinas argues, the most appropriate way for God to show his love for us. A more formal explanation and expansion of this view is offered by Peter Abelard, and Bonaventure is the master in this respect, since he systematically works to put Abelard's Exemplarism together with Anselm's insight. The basic idea of the exemplarist view of the cross is that, in the enduring of the crucifixion God exemplified for us in the most appropriate way what self-sacrificial love is. In that moment Christ combats and overcomes his own will and does the will of the Father - something which lies at the heart of the Christian discipline. In other words, Christ's action furnished for us the most multi-vocal and powerful symbol of Love which is possible to imagine.

Tyrel said...

Second Part:



Therefore, the question is answered, on a Christian view, with a view to 'appropriateness'. Perhaps I could formalize briefly how such an argument would go in this context:
Consider that in both A and H people have free will, and are more-or-less the same as people are today. In world H, whatever God did do, he did not exemplify his solidarity with man, nor his complete love for man, to its fullest degree, since there is no fuller expression than the incarnation, in combination with the crucifixion and the resurrection, for God's love. This is at least plausible given what we know about Love: love always fights for the good of the other, and disregards the good of the self when/where the other is concerned. Love identifies with the other and draws us out of ourselves. etc etc.

Given all of this as background, it seems plausible that on A more people come to be saved (i.e. come to Love God and die to themselves - their self-ish-ness). Given that Free Will is a factor, of course it is logically possible for H and A to have the same number of people who are saved, as it is possible for H to have more people who are saved. However, if we should consider the set of all possible H worlds, against the set of all possible A worlds, it would be sufficient if A worlds had on average more people saved than H worlds did. Even if the increase was minimal, it would not be negligible (and indeed, I can't think of any good reason why it would be negligible). Therefore, a Christian might want to argue that God chose to actualize A precisely because it yielded, on average (given all possible A worlds) more saved people.
Of course, the argument here might become tricky if one were to argue that the set of A worlds and the set of H worlds are both infinite sets, but that problem isn't necessarily a defeater.
Alternatively, one can always fall back on reasons of appropriateness alone, since perhaps God freely chose to exemplify his love in the fullest way possible as an act of free will, just as when he created the world.

Ben Wallis said...

Thanks for the comments Tyrel. It's an interesting idea that God wants to provide an example of love for us to follow, and so that's why he sets up his rules of justice.

It's also interesting that you mention Abelard. I think I had better read some of his philosophy, since up to now I've only really known him for his romantic misadventures, which seems a shame.

I'm not sure how I feel about the exemplar idea though. It still seems to leave a lot unanswered, but maybe that's just because I need to think on in further.

Tyrel said...

Abelard's life is a sad story, but he was a towering intellect. In fact, he is often recognized as the father of the philosophy of language itself. His theology is pretty engaging, and although there are some elements which have been judged to be slightly off the mark in some minor respects, his method of philosophical theology set the tone for much of Medieval theology after him.

Hezekiah Ahaz said...

"In short, appealing to a system of rules to explain Jesus' suffering on the cross isn't helpful unless we understand how that system of rules improves our overall well-being. So, since we don't know how God's favorite system of rules of cosmic justice improves our overall well-being, it cannot adequately explain Jesus' suffering."



Hi Ben,

Well, we could of all just ended up in hell.

I think not ending up in hell is a great improvement.


Do you think Ben that a judge is under any obligation to show mercy and compassion to a criminal?


Why do you think Judges care about the system of law?

Reynold said...

Hezekiah Ahaz
Do you think Ben that a judge is under any obligation to show mercy and compassion to a criminal?
How many judges have a worse criminal record than the criminals they sentence?

Your god, if the bible is to be believed, is a child-killer, a woman-killer and a mass-murderer.

Very few atheists have hit all those cylinders.

If killing babies is not wrong when god does it, why is it wrong when we do it? Is not your god the "standard" for this "absolute morality" that you xians pretend to have?

If it's because god has "reasons" for doing so then it's just situational ethics, not absolute morality.

If something is good because god does it, then that's subjective morality, NOT absolute morality. It's all subjective based on the whims of your god.

In that case, how can his behaviour be used as a moral standard for US?

Remember the verse Matthew 5:48
Be therefore perfect, just as your Father who is in Heaven is perfect.

Tom Cantine said...

Hezekiah, I'm not sure that addresses the point. Yes, not being in Hell is better than being in Hell, sure. But presumably an omnipotent God could have established a set of rules under which we could have been saved from Hell at a cost less than that of making Jesus suffer on the cross. You can just boldly assert that these rules are the only ones under which we could have stayed out of Hell, but without some kind of argument for that claim, it's not very persuasive.

Hezekiah Ahaz said...

Tom,

And maybe he couldn't.

I'm not sure what omnipotence has to do with anything.

Tom Cantine said...

Good point. I just sort of assumed that omnipotence was a generally accepted attribute of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God, but we need not assume that. So maybe He can't establish, alter or suspend) the fundamental principles that govern the universe. Of course, by definition that rules out miracles. Or maybe He can only suspend SOME rules, but not others, and apparently the rule that makes the crucifixion a prerequisite for our salvation is one He couldn't suspend. But this starts to get silly after a while, postulating ad hoc rule after ad hoc metarule just to try and salvage a particular interpretation of scripture; there comes a point when abandoning the interpretation is the most parsimonious solution.

Hezekiah Ahaz said...

Tom,

God governs the universe.

My point is our understanding of omnipotence is quite different.

God is all-powerful however he can't use his power to do it all.

Ben Wallis said...

Tyrel,

I know it's late in the game, but the recent activity here (Hi, Tom!) inspired me to give you the complete response you are due. In your first part you seem to take for granted that justice is worth (indeed "demands") satisfying. But why is that the case? The point of my blog post is to remind Christians that appealing to justice only makes sense as an explanation if we already understand the value of justice. In the case of human justice this is no problem. But in the case of God's cosmic justice, we have no reason (apart possibly from God's mysterious assurances) to think it valuable at all, since it doesn't actually seem to help anyone. So I don't see how forcing on Jesus that kind of unhelpful justice constitutes a symbol of God's love.

In your second part though you offer two additional options for the Christian. First, you suggest that God wants to show "solidarity" with man, and he accomplishes this by having himself crucified in human form. However, I'm not sure how this is supposed to help anyone. I don't know about you, but I don't value that kind of behavior at all. It doesn't make me feel closer to God. Maybe other people want to see God do that to himself, but that's not at all clear. Moreover, this seems an entirely different appeal than to justice.

Next, you suggest that more people are saved on (H) than on (A). I guess this is an extension of the idea that people would appreciate God showing solidarity with them, and respond by doing whatever it is they need to do to be saved. The thing is, I don't agree that it is likely that more people are saved on (H) than on (A). Oh, it's possible (like pretty much anything is possible), but if we're looking for an explanation then it doesn't help to appeal to arbitrary possibilities.

Again, I want to remind you that I wasn't denying justice could play a role in determining why God had Jesus suffer. It's just that such appeals aren't very illuminating if we don't already understand why justice is helpful or worthwhile. Well, the same goes for your last suggestion about more people getting saved on scenario (A). Maybe you're correct, and more people really are saved on (A). But that's not very good as an explanation, since it's not at all clear that more people should be saved in (A).

Regards,
Ben

Ben Wallis said...

Tom,

You are quite correct that I have taken omnipotence for granted. If God is just doing the best he can to help us with his limited powers and resources, then that potentially opens up a bunch of options for explaining why God wanted Jesus to suffer.

However it's not obvious to me how even denying omnipotence would help unless we knew his particular limitations relevant to the issue. A better option would be to also deny omniscience, in which case God's justice system could serve pretty much the same sort of deterrence/rehabilitation/retribution needs that our human justice systems serve.

But of course few Christians would be willing to do that.

Regards,
Ben

Tom Cantine said...

Here's another thought that just occurred to me. If we take the idea that Jesus was God, then the whole charade of dying on the cross is really no big deal. For us mortal humans, it's a terrifying prospect, but for the Creator of the entire universe, it's scarcely more than a card trick, especially when you've got resurrection to look forward to after only three days. So maybe, for Jesus, dying on the cross wasn't really a gross injustice, but only a minor inconvenience.

Of course, that makes it all the more pointless. Instead of "Why did God want Jesus to suffer?" the question becomes "Why was it necessary for God/Jesus to go through a pantomime 'sacrifice' in which He actually lost nothing at all, before we could be saved?"

Hezekiah Ahaz said...

Tom,

It's the world we live in.

God can't violate certain principles.

Jesus' death says a lot about God.

For example, his commitment to uphold perfection, goodness, holiness etc.


That might not mean a lot to humans but it does to God.

Ben Wallis said...

Tom,

Just to clarify, I wasn't alleging that Jesus' death was an injustice. Maybe it was or maybe it wasn't. But my point in this blog post is that the whole idea of cosmic justice doesn't serve any recognizable purpose for a divine being with unlimited resources. In other words, so what if cosmic justice is violated? Why care about cosmic justice in the first place?

Regards,
Ben

Reynold said...

Hezekiah Ahaz
For example, his commitment to uphold perfection, goodness, holiness etc.
Right, so he can practice decetion as shown in 1 Samuel 16:1-6, practice genocide as shown so many times in the OT and he's still "perfect" and "good"?

What would god have to do to be "not good" then?

Dave G. said...

A very good post on a very good subject. Nice discussion. This looks like a blog from a non-religious viewpoint I can come by and enjoy. Thanks for the reference.

Paul said...

Hi Ben,

"Christians face an interesting theological challenge regarding the crucifixion of Jesus, insofar as we want to know why Jesus had to suffer in order to save the faithful. God, being omnipotent, appears to have the power to save the faithful, regardless of whether he also sent Jesus to suffer on the cross."

The "problem" isn't obvious. God's omnipotence doesn't mean he can do anything we can think of. Moreover, it's a modal fallacy to move from could to would. But let's explore this:

What are you claiming, that God, because he is omnipotent, could save someone willy-nilly? That is, Hitler (a paradigmatic stand in for 'most horrible person we can think of') could live however he pleased, and then upon death just waltz into heaven without so much as a "sorry?" You might say, "No, he's *got to* say sorry." Really, why? I thought God was "omnipotent." He can do "anything" and doesn't "need" anything to obtain in order to save us.

Next, the "challenge" is imprecise and possibly suffers from an unproven bias. There is no challenge for God doesn't need *Jesus* to save in that it is supposedly necessary that the *Son* become incarnate. The Spirit could have, or so I say.

Lastly, the Bible teaches us (e.g., Hebrews 9:11) that "without the shedding of blood there is no remission for sin." But your view is that this is not necessary. That God doesn't "need" blood to forgive sin. So your objection is not one that is internal to Christian theism, for it supposes that God misspoke. In Christian theology, the reason is that God is just. We need not have some rigorous, spelled out system of "justice" to make sense of this. It's simply that God is holy and *must* punish sin. It need not be "good for us." He cannot just let "bye-gones be bye-gones." Just let child molesters into heaven without so much of a "Awe shucks, I'm sorry." Regarding salvation, well, that's not *justice*, it's *mercy*, and I take it as a *datum* that mercy is good for us. But since since must be punished, there needs to be a substitute. Now, you may not *like* this whole system, but that's another objection.

Second, you start talking about "Jesus" having the "same amount of joy." Well, first, Jesus refers to the *incarnate, historical person* who became incarnate for our salvation. Without that, the incarnation makes little sense. But aside from that, Jesus tells us that "*greater love* has no one than this, that a man would lay down his life for his friends." The context here is obviously *salvation*. It's the greatest instance of laying down a life for a life. Like, waaaaay better than Denzel in Man on Fire, for example. So in a world where Jesus does not lay down his life is a world where "greater love" (greatest love) isn't instantiated. Presumably, this leads to *lesser* overall joy for Jesus. Second, speaking from experience, I think I have much greater joy, and a greater appreciation, for the weay things went in the actual world than your stipulated arbitrary God who just let's child rapists walk right on into heaven without even feeling bad; and then perhaps tossing the raped girl in heave. Remember, God is "omnipotent" and so doesn't "need" *anything* from the rapist and can't be constrained to not send the girl to hell for her sins (granting she has some ad arguendo).

Oh, and lastly, "omnibenevolence" isn't one of the traditional, classical attributes of God. it really rears its head in the 19th century. I believe God is good, and perfectly so, but I myself don't agree with the term. A Catholic philosopher (PhD) points this out here:

http://branemrys.blogspot.com/2011/07/omnibenevolence.html

So unfortunately, I think your argument goes wrong in just so many different ways.

Paul said...

Also, this has been discussed in the literature, esp. in connection with Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, see:

Anselm on the Necessity of the Incarnation
Leftow, Brian. Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion31. 2 (Jun 1995): 167-185.

A Defense of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo Argument
Rogers, Katherin A. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association74 (2000): 187-200.

But the Calvinist tradition has its own spin, Paul Helm has several discussion on this in his books on Calvin.

Anyway, FWIW

Ben Wallis said...

Paul,

Thanks for the comments, but it appears you have misunderstood the blog post. I am not arguing that God should save everyone, or that God could do this or that. Rather, I'm arguing that an appeal to justice will fail to help explain why God wanted Jesus to suffer before he would save the faithful.

Regards,
Ben

Paul said...

Hi Ben, it appears you missed the point of my comments in direct response to quotes from your blog post, and a good read would have indicated that I did not say that you "were arguing that God should save everyone." Regarding your remark about what you did argue for, I'm afraid you missed that I responded to that to.

Ben Wallis said...

Paul,

Sorry for the delay. Here's a more detailed response to your comments.

You wrote:

"The "problem" isn't obvious."

I agree, and that's why I wrote a blog post explaining it.

"God's omnipotence doesn't mean he can do anything we can think of."

He can't do what is logically impossible for him to do, obviously. Perhaps there are other restrictions you want to place on his omnipotence, but as long as his wishes always come true then that is quite sufficient for the argument.

"Moreover, it's a modal fallacy to move from could to would."

Well then it's a good thing I didn't do that! : )

"What are you claiming, that God, because he is omnipotent, could save someone willy-nilly? That is, Hitler (a paradigmatic stand in for 'most horrible person we can think of') could live however he pleased, and then upon death just waltz into heaven without so much as a "sorry?""

I do claim that if God wishes Hitler to be saved then he can save Hitler (even if Hitler refuses to apologize). Maybe you think that, necessarily, God does not wish for people like Hitler to be saved unless they apologize, or their sin is atoned for, or whatever else. But then the question is, why does God have those wishes? The challenge here regards reconciling God's wishes with his supposed omnibenevolence.

"Next, the "challenge" is imprecise and possibly suffers from an unproven bias."

I don't know what makes you say that. In what way do you judge it imprecise? I thought I was pretty clear, identifying and labeling the various questions at issue, and explaining their connections per the challenge.

To recap, notice that (2) is not a satisfactory answer to (C) unless we also have an answer to (C'). Since we do not in fact have an answer to (C'), that means (2) is not a satisfactory answer to (C). That is my argument, distilled.

And what is this "unproven bias" you suspect of me?

"There is no challenge for God doesn't need *Jesus* to save in that it is supposedly necessary that the *Son* become incarnate. The Spirit could have, or so I say."

My challenge doesn't require it to be necessary that God wants Jesus to suffer. It is sufficient to hypothesize that God actually wants Jesus to suffer, in which case it is natural to ask, why does he want such a thing?

I submit that nobody has a satisfactory answer to that question.

"Lastly, the Bible teaches us (e.g., Hebrews 9:11) that "without the shedding of blood there is no remission for sin." But your view is that this is not necessary. That God doesn't "need" blood to forgive sin. So your objection is not one that is internal to Christian theism, for it supposes that God misspoke."

My argument does not require us to deny your interpretation of Heb 9:11. I'm not sure why you got the wrong impression about that, but let me assure you now, it is not part of my argument that God doesn't need blood to forgive sin. You are free to think he does.

(cont.)

Ben Wallis said...

(cont.)

"In Christian theology, the reason is that God is just. We need not have some rigorous, spelled out system of "justice" to make sense of this."

I don't demand that you spell out God's justice system in detail. But in order to have your appeal to God's justice work as a satisfactory answer to (C), I do demand that you also answer (C'). The problem is, nobody seems to be able to answer (C').

"It's simply that God is holy and *must* punish sin. It need not be "good for us." He cannot just let "bye-gones be bye-gones." Just let child molesters into heaven without so much of a "Awe shucks, I'm sorry." Regarding salvation, well, that's not *justice*, it's *mercy*, and I take it as a *datum* that mercy is good for us. But since since must be punished, there needs to be a substitute. Now, you may not *like* this whole system, but that's another objection."

It's not that I don't like it. Rather, it's that appealing to the system isn't helpful in reconciling God's omnibenevolence with his wish for Jesus to suffer. That God really loves his favorite cosmic justice system doesn't tell us anything about how Jesus' suffering improves the well-being of conscious creatures. It might be true that Jesus' suffering is good, but if so, it is a complete mystery why it should be true.

"Well, first, Jesus refers to the *incarnate, historical person* who became incarnate for our salvation. Without that, the incarnation makes little sense."

I do not deny that Jesus refers to the "incarnate, historical person." So I'm not sure why you brought this up.

(cont.)

Ben Wallis said...

(cont.)

"But aside from that, Jesus tells us that "*greater love* has no one than this, that a man would lay down his life for his friends." The context here is obviously *salvation*. It's the greatest instance of laying down a life for a life. Like, waaaaay better than Denzel in Man on Fire, for example. So in a world where Jesus does not lay down his life is a world where "greater love" (greatest love) isn't instantiated. Presumably, this leads to *lesser* overall joy for Jesus."

Well this is a somewhat different topic than my blog post addressed. However, it's worth mentioning that this answer leads to a problem similar to that which we encountered for (2). In particular, it is not remotely clear why laying down one's life is an act of love, much less the greatest possible act of love. Remember, God has the power to do things without sacrifice, if only he wishes it. So God can accomplish whatever he wishes quite independently of whether Jesus lays down his life. How then is it an act of love for Jesus to lay down his life? As long as this question remains unanswered, it's not going to be helpful to appeal to the supposed fact that laying down one's life is the greatest possible act of love.

"Second, speaking from experience, I think I have much greater joy, and a greater appreciation, for the weay things went in the actual world than your stipulated arbitrary God who just let's child rapists walk right on into heaven without even feeling bad; and then perhaps tossing the raped girl in heave."

At the risk of offending you, I would seriously consider reevaluating your feelings there. For my own part, I don't want to be the sort of person who just wants other people to suffer, regardless of their wrongdoings. It might be necessary from a practical standpoint to have the guilty suffer in order to help protect the innocent, but that doesn't mean we should want the guilty to suffer for suffering's sake. If only there was a way to make everyone happy, that would be cause for great celebration!

But returning to the argument: If God does not wish to inform you that the actual world is any other way than what brings you the most joy, then this is not an issue. In that case, he is free to let you go on thinking whatever it is that makes you happy and joyful, without having Jesus actually suffer.

Oh, and lastly, "omnibenevolence" isn't one of the traditional, classical attributes of God. it really rears its head in the 19th century. I believe God is good, and perfectly so, but I myself don't agree with the term."

Okay, well if you want to deny that God is omnibenevolent, or if you think that the very notion of omnibenevolence is somehow incoherent, then the challenge may not apply to you. In particular, maybe you think that God just isn't all that interested in the well-being of conscious creatures. But if you think that God really does always wish for the greater balance of well-being, then the challenge stands.

Regards,
Ben